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ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to show the complexity of the political, legal, social and economic 
environments where the Algerian State-Owned Firms operate. These environments are qualified by 
“uncertainty” given the instability of the different parameters cited. Since 1988, Algeria has initiated deeper 
economic reforms supported by significant legislation and international agreements. In this uncertain 
environment, Algerian State-Owned Firm cannot rely only on their internal capabilities. They should, create 
partnerships, both with suppliers, subcontractors, universities and even competitors. There is a need for these 
firms to: Transform their organization to a new form improved for unexpected events and enough resilience to 
adapt to uncertain environments. Build a Strategic Intelligence Information System able to facilitate decision-
making and reduce risks inherent to the strategic choices. Find ways to reverse choice when unexpected events 
occur. This article shows there is a need to handle the following risks: Inertia against the process of 
organizational transformation, wrong understanding of the received signals from the environment and poor 
reaction of the decision-maker to signals and events in the environment.  
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1. Introduction 
Since 1988, Algeria has initiated deeper economic 
reforms guided by two famous international 
agreements: 
 
- Signature on December 2001, the Association 
Agreement with the European Union, effective 
since September 2005;  (1) 
- Application for membership to the WTO 
introduced on June 1987, considered by the 
Algerian government as "a sovereign choice 
and necessity". (2) Negotiations are still 
ongoing in 2014. 
 
These reforms are supported by a significant 
legislation. The most important are (3): 
 
- Law 90-10 of April 14, 1990 on the money and 
credit, amended by Ordinance 03-11 of August 
26, 2003 on money and credit; 
- The Investment Code promulgated on October 
13, 1993, completed by Ordinance 01-03 of 
August 20, 2001 on the development of 
investment and amended by Ordinance No. 06-
08 of 15 July 2006; 
- Ordinance 01-04 of August 20, 2001 on the 
organization, management and privatization of 
state-owned enterprises; 
- Law 10-05 of August 15, 2010 on the 
Competition, amending and completing 
Ordinance 03-03 of July 19, 2003 and Law 08-
12 of June 25, 2008; 
- Law 13-01 of February 20, 2013 on the 
Hydrocarbons, amending Law 05-07 of April 
28, 2005 and Ordinance 06-10 of July 29,  
2006; 
- Various finance laws until 2014. 
 
It has resulted in an open economic market 
affecting almost all sectors in favor of new private 
and foreign entrants. This opening has not spared 
even some sectors considered strategic and largely 
protected until the end of the 1990s, such as Mining 
and Energy (Baaziz, 2004). 
 
                                                          
(1) Official website of European Union, «UE, 
Instrument européen de voisinage et de partenariat 
– Algérie Document de Stratégie», 2007-2013,  
Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/algeria/index
_en.htm   
(2)  Official website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Available at: http://www.mae.dz 
(3) Official wesite of Ministry of Industry, PME 
and Promotion of Investments. Available at: 
http://www.mipmepi.gov.dz  
Among the first effects of these reforms, we’ve 
observe deeper changes in the Algerian economic 
landscape, including (Baaziz, 2004): 
 
- Reorganization of State-Owner’s Firms called 
“Economic Public Enterprises” to 
“Corporations Enterprises” or “Limited 
Liability Companies”; 
- Bankruptcy or privatization of hundreds of 
State-Owned Enterprises(4); 
- Set up of many partnerships (such as joint 
venture, merger, acquisition, association and 
interest group) with foreign firms in various 
sectors such as consumer electronics, chemical 
and pharmaceutical industry and even the 
energy sector; 
- Market/customer orientation and new 
marketing practices. 
 
Inapt to follow quick changes and uncertainty of 
the new environments, Algerian State-Owned 
Firms are strongly shaken by deregulation of their 
market usually protected and acquired (Baaziz, 
2012). They find themselves in an aggressive 
competitive environment occupied by new 
emergent entrants. 
 
The Algerian government has abandoned its 
protector role without providing a required 
regulatory role. In fact, the transition from a 
planned economy based on state monopole on all 
economics sectors to a market economy based on 
free competition and characterized by the 
emergence of local and foreign private sector 
implies radical changes both politically and 
institutionally (regarding Algerian State) on the 
organizational, strategic and technological plans for 
State-Owned Firms. 
 
The classic business model within which the 
Algerian State-Owned Firms was not confronted to 
market adaptation needs. The management 
approach was purely rules-based forecasting, 
planning and rationalization of tasks without 
unduly concern with the market itself. Henri Fayol 
in the 1920’s, described the five principles of this 
style of management still relevant in almost all 
Algerian State-Owned Firms delaying the leap of 
change: planning, organizing, commanding, 
coordinating, controlling (Fernandez, 2008). 
 
 
                                                          
(4) Official wesite of Ministry of Industry, PME 
and Promotion of Investments. Available: 
http://www.mipmepi.gov.dz  
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2. Method 
What organizational and technological leverages 
will grasp Algerian State-Owned Firms to deal with 
the uncertainties of this new competitive 
environment? It is obvious that in such uncertain 
competitive environment, the Algerian State-
Owned Firm cannot rely only on its internal 
capabilities. It must look out of the box, create 
partnerships, both with suppliers, contractors, 
universities and even competitors (Couture, 2000). 
 
On the organizational level, it is necessary to find 
new forms of organization that are more flexible, 
resilient and able to promote innovation and hold 
strategic positioning in such environments (Baaziz 
& Quoniam, 2013). 
 
On the technological level, a strategic alignment of 
an Information System is needed and will be able 
to (Baaziz, 2012): 
 
- Federate internally, its knowledge and critical 
skills; 
- Scan the environment in order to detect any 
positive signals to grasp desired strategic 
positioning; 
- Facilitate decision making and reduce its risks 
under uncertainty. 
 
Hence the need for these firms to: 
 
- Transform its current organization to a new 
form of proactive organization improved for 
unexpected events and resilient enough to 
adapt to uncertain environments. 
- Build a Strategic Intelligence Information 
System (SIIS), able to facilitate decision-
making and reduce risks inherent to the 
strategic choices (Baaziz, 2012). 
- Find ways to make the reversible choices if 
occur unexpected events (AO2008, 2012). 
 
3. What are the risks linked to such changes? 
 
The risks are closely linked to three (03) sources of 
uncertainty: (i) Environment; (ii) Information and 
(iii) Decision-maker. 
 
3.1 Risks linked to the Environment: 
The major risk in the environment is "inertia" or 
resistance to fast and radical changes due to the 
transformation to the new form of organization 
(Keen, 1981). 
 
3.2 Risks linked to Information: 
The risk of information is a poor understanding and 
interpretation of signals received from the 
environment. 
 
3.3 Risks linked to the Decision-maker: 
The risk to the Decision-maker is poor reaction to 
signals and events in the environment. 
 
4. Literature Review: Environment and 
Information. 
In the sixth century BC, Sun Tzu in "the art of 
war", describes how to recognize “a weak signal”. 
For him, an expert should be able to feel (touch, 
see, hear) what a common man cannot predict, so 
should be able to feel a weak signal. 
 
Clausewitz (1832) raises the debate about the 
relationship between war and the economy. 
Percepts of "military strategy". could be applied to 
the economic affairs (trade in particular) in this 
period. Yet, it isn’t. It was only in the mid 1960s 
that it was used by Alfred Chandler in his book 
"Strategy and Structure" published in 1963, then in 
1965 by Igor Ansoff, in his book "Corporate 
Strategy " (Ducreux et al., 2009). 
 
We often attribute the authorship of "weak signals" 
to Ansoff. However, as early as 1964, Pierre 
Massé, “Ponts et Chaussées” Engineer, Plan 
General Commissioner of the French Republic, in a 
famous prospective study “Horizon 1985”, 
formulated the concept of " facts promising for the 
future". This fuzzy concept is paradoxical (because 
It can be verified only in the future) is considered 
one of the founders of prospective concepts. In 
1967, Massé finished his idea by saying that 
intuition and reasoning must be confirmed by the 
facts (Rossel, 2012). Although Ansoff, who has 
borrowed the idea of weak signal from the theory 
of information, may be considered to have 
developed its own parallel approach mainly 
oriented towards business and management 
uncertainties, French futurists then treated 
essentially society and public policy questions 
(Rossel, 2012).  
 
Bright (1970) had already stated that companies 
undergoing an increasingly changing and turbulent 
environment. He was thus one of the first to talk 
about the importance of environment scanning and 
monitoring to anticipate technological changes that 
could give rise to opportunities and threats. He 
introduced at the same time new concepts such as 
"signs of change", "significant signal" and "early 
signals". 
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On the same assumptions of changing and turbulent 
environments, Ansoff (1975) developed the 
concept of "weak signals" as an alternative to “the 
strategic planning” that in the 1970s and 1980s was 
a dominant future-oriented approach in firms and 
organizations. He declared that strategic planning is 
reasonable in the case of progressive development 
of historical trends, but it is not operative to deal 
with the unexpected or surprises. According Ansoff 
(1975), strategic planning requires strong signals. 
The information available from the start must be 
sufficiently precise to enable appropriate responses 
(Holopainena & Toivonen, 2012). Ansoff focuses 
on the responses of the company but also on the 
related statements of knowledge that is the result of 
external or internal interactions. According him, the 
best strategies are divided into three main options: 
those that improve awareness and understanding of 
the business, those that increase the flexibility of 
the company and those that allow the company to 
directly address threats or opportunities (Rossel, 
2012). 
 
Porter (1985) introduced the concept of value chain 
(internal analysis of the firm with its strengths & 
weaknesses) and the concept of the five forces, that 
all affect the firm (external environment with its 
opportunities and threats). The combination of the 
two concepts provides strategic analysis leading to 
decisions. 
 
Kaplan & Norton (1992) by formalizing the 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) concept through four 
Perspectives (Financial, Customer, Internal 
Processes and Growth), built a chain of causes and 
effects leading to the strategic success of an 
organization. It based on four assumptions, the first 
being: "Innovation of creative people is the only 
insured source of long-term strategic success and 
every other aspect of the organization can be 
replicated by others". We understand that it is the 
knowledge held by the firm. 
 
Cook & Cook (2000) and Hameed (2004) tried to 
explain similarities and differences between 
Knowledge Management (KM) and Business 
Intelligence (BI). 
 
According to Pesqueux (2004), KM is an area that 
cannot extend beyond the firm’s boundary. As soon 
as we are interested in what happens outside, we 
move to another area than Competitive Intelligence 
(CI). In the strict sense, KM is the process of 
internal knowledge creation (knowledge, skills, 
best practices, etc.), which is not the knowledge 
obtained from outside, via the Internet, for 
example. It is rather the "environment scanning”. In 
this case, CI becomes a requirement for capturing 
and analyzing signals from the external 
environment and to deal with its threats and grasp 
the best opportunities available to the firm. 
 
Jakobiak (2006) tried to explain the link between 
Knowledge Management and Competitive 
Intelligence and the contribution of KM to support 
CI and its development. According to (Jakobiak, 
2006), KM is not a main goal but a simple mean. 
The assessment of the links between CI and KM 
provides a large overview of KM techniques grant 
high interest for CI specialists. 
 
Bretonès & Said (2006) attempted to analyze the 
difference and complementarities between two 
important areas of research: CI and KM, proposing 
an understanding framework of links between these 
two areas. 
 
Goria (2006) described the merger, similarities and 
complementarities between KM and CI domains. 
The same concerns were raised by (Blondel et al. 
2006). 
 
Liebowitz (2006) introduced a concept of Strategic 
Intelligence (SI). He defines it as the aggregation of 
other types of intelligentsia able to providing value-
added information and knowledge toward making 
organizational strategic decisions.  The emphasis is 
on how best to position the firm to deal with future 
challenges and opportunities to maximize the 
firm’s success. He noted that the SI forms the outer 
layer of the "onion", with the inside layers being 
Artificial Intelligence (AI), Knowledge 
Management (KM), Business Intelligence (BI) and 
Competitive Intelligence (CI). 
5. Risks and uncertainties. 
Knight (1921) suggests in "Risk, Uncertainty and 
Profit", the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty. By expanding the scope of analysis to 
the general attitude of the actor facing these two 
concepts, without limited to economic aspects, then 
we can distinguish three situations: 
 
1. Certainty: Each action is known to lead to 
certainly, to a specific outcome. 
2. Risks: Every action leads to a specific set of 
possible outcomes and each outcome occurring 
with a known probability. 
3. Uncertainty: The actions may lead to a set of 
consequences, but where the probabilities of 
these outcomes are completely unknown. A 
risky situation where the outcome is unknown 
to the decision-maker who do not know what 
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the result will be. This uncertainty can lead to 
bad choices. 
 
For March & Shapira (1987), decision making and 
risk are closely dependent on the context. It is 
therefore important to look at the context of the 
decision. 
 
A lot of research on attitudes to risk has informed 
our understanding of how individuals act to 
manage risk situations (Baird & Thomas, 1985) 
(MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986) (March & 
Shapira, 1987) and (Wehrung & al. 1989). 
 
For Pablo & al. (1996), once the risky decision is 
made, the decision maker is likely to focus on how 
to achieve the best possible result when attempting 
to take more risks as favorable as possible, inherent 
in the selected target. This proposal is consistent 
with organizational research that argues that when 
firms are against a hostile environment, they act to 
improve and manage their environment (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). 
 
According to Riabacke (2006), with the exception 
of studies by (MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1986) 
and (Shapira, 1995), empirical research has not 
enough focused on the conceptions of risk and risk-
taking held by managers. Indeed, until now, no 
study has investigated the manager’s risk attitudes 
in parallel to their actual behavior when handling 
risky prospects. The area remains relatively open 
for new research. 
 
For Riabacke (2006), Managers often overlook the 
normative rules of decision-making in risky 
situations. They often rely on intuition that seems 
correct. They justify their inability to handle many 
situations at risk due to lack of information while 
affirming their fear of making poor decisions. The 
majority of managers insist that there are a lot of 
unwritten rules built into the culture that guide 
them when making decisions. Using computer-
based decision support could be one way to avoid 
these practices. 
 
Weick & Sutcliffe (2007) defined five principles 
for firms to deal with unexpected events and 
phenomena: 
 
1. Preoccupation with failure: Small failure’s 
hunting is the responsibility of all actors in 
the firm. Any deviation must be reported as a 
potential risk. 
2. Reluctance to simplify: Everyone must resist 
to the temptation to simplify. 
3. Sensitivity to operations: All levels of the 
firm must be concerned with its activities and 
operations. 
4. Commitment to resilience: Everyone must 
ensure the resilience of the system so that 
operations can continue. Being able to learn 
from unexpected events to improve the ability 
to prevent, reduce or even contain future 
mistakes. 
5. Deference to expertise: The decision making 
process must be fluid, able to reconstruct 
different situations. The expertise prevails 
over hierarchical rank. 
6. Organizational transformation... 
The need to make decisions against uncertainty and 
randomness is a recurring source of risks that can 
push the firm to cooperate with others. Risk 
management plays a key role in many strategic 
decisions (March & Shapira, 1987). 
 
Most managers spend nearly half their time in 
planning activities related. But in a complex and 
changing environment, planning is necessary but 
not sufficient (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). 
  
We agree the assumption that the alleged strength 
of organizations is not so obvious (Weick, 2009) 
and that focusing on the lack of information to 
decide, managers try to take advantage of uncertain 
situations. In this perspective, uncertainty and risk 
are not necessarily a negative impact on firms. 
They can also create opportunities (Weick, 2009).  
 
Thus organizations should be proactive towards 
their environment, rather than reactive (Weick, 
2009). This shift (“mutation” or “transformation”) 
to a new form of resilient organization is needed to 
deal with the uncertain environment and support 
the strategic alignment of its Information System 
(Baaziz, 2012). 
 
Political, socio-technical and economic aspects are 
crucial to overcome inertia and begin a 
transformation process (Besson & Rowe, 2011). 
 
Transformation process should be achieved through 
several distinct phases (Besson & Rowe, 2011). It 
should be gradual and scalable (Keen, 1981) that 
firms are very hierarchical, so that they can drive 
change and overcome the "inertia" inherent in this 
type of transformation (Besson & Rowe, 2011). A 
strategy of change management must be associated 
to the transformation in order to reduce risks and 
uncertainties of the mutation’s phases (Besson & 
Rowe, 2011). 
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6.1 Uncertainty in the Decision Making Process  
Decision is a set of processes to select an option 
among several alternatives. The Decision-maker 
makes his choice by comparing the expected 
consequences of different options. 
 
The uncertainty in a competitive environment can 
come from three different sources: (i) Environment: 
Context of the environment; (ii) Information: 
Information captured from the environment; and 
(iii) Decision-maker: Interpretation of information 
captured from the environment. 
6.2 Environment uncertainties 
Uncertainties linked to the Environment are 
variables of environment where the decision is 
made. The uncertainty factors are either internal or 
external to the firm. 
6.2.1 Internal factors : 
These are internal factors that influence the 
decision and act both on upstream and downstream 
of the decision-making process (AO2008, 2011): 
 
- Information Management: Collection, storage, 
archiving and inefficient management of 
information are some probable factors that 
might disrupt the flow and sharing of the 
information within a firm. Indeed, few 
Algerian State-Owned Firms are not yet 
equipped with an Electronic Document 
Management (EDM) for the effective 
management of their important records and 
documents (Baaziz & Quoniam, 2013). 
 
- Hierarchical factors: Main characteristic of the 
hierarchical organization that may have a big 
impact on the decision readability (Baumard, 
1997). Majors proxy manager in Algerian 
State-Owned Firms, don’t know the extent of 
their delegated powers of decision. To avoid 
any legal liability resulting from decision 
making, most of these managers turn to their 
superiors at the first difficulty they encounter. 
In this case, the instructions returned by the 
superiors are usually verbal thereby 
complicating decision-making process and 
finally, the legal responsibility falls on the 
proxy manager. 
6.2.2 External factors: 
These are external contextual factors that may 
influence the firm's decision and the future of the 
firm (Baaziz, 2012; AO2008, 2011): 
 
- Shareholder pressure: The corporate 
management is accountable to its shareholders. 
This pressure is higher when the exclusive 
shareholder (the owner) is the State as in case 
of Algerian State-Owned Firms. 
 
- Power of political lobby: The political 
cooptation around a power lobby (group effect) 
implies the main manager’s profile is not the 
managerial competencies but simply that 
allegiance to the political group is the 
necessary condition for access to managerial 
positions in state-owned firms. Therefore, 
these managers don’t have skills and attitudes 
of decision-makers; they systematically refer 
to the goodwill of the political lobby. This 
group effect is in fact a behavior pattern of a 
person bound to the status requirements and 
the group’s expectations. Political affiliation is 
often preferred over the sense of belonging to 
the firm. 
 
- Pressure of social partner (Syndicate): The 
weight of the social partners is more important 
in social and professional conflicts in the State-
Owned Firms than in the private sector. In fact, 
the Syndicates are deeply entrenched in the 
Algerian State-Owned Firm and have a direct 
impact on major decisions. The pressures are 
generally focused on salary increases for 
SONATRACH in the second half of 2011(5), 
and ALGERIE TELECOM in December 
2012(6), opposition to the privatization of State-
Owned Firms and their consequences such as 
layoff plans result of the strike of workers 
following the acquisition of all shares of the 
ENGI by the German giant of Industrial Gas 
LINDE in July 2011(7).  
                                                          
(5) El-Watan, newspaper of June 09th, 2011, 
Sonatrach : Malaise sur les salaires, Available: 
http://www.elwatan.com/economie/sonatrach-
malaise-sur-les-salaires-06-09-2011-
138723_111.php  
(6)  Liberté, newspaper of December 13th, 2012, 
Conflit Algérie Télécom, Un conseil syndical prévu 
avant la fin décembre, Available: 
http://www.algerie360.com/algerie/conflit-algerie-
telecom-un-conseil-syndical-prevu-avant-la-fin-
decembre/ 
(7) Le Quotidien d'Oran, newspaper July 9th, 2011,  
Grève des travailleurs de Linde Gas Algérie: Les 
hôpitaux risquent de manquer d'oxygène. 
Available: http://www.lequotidien-
oran.com/index.php?news=5155366 
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To curb a social climate in effervescence, 
managers tend to "calm the game", temper 
their actions and freeze critical decisions. 
Anyway, in case of deterioration of the social 
climate (strike threat by the unions "social 
partner", for example), their hierarchies prefer 
sacrificing them in order to maintain a 
precarious equilibrium of social peace. Given 
this state, managers prefer a status quo leading 
to inertia. 
 
- Threat of merger and acquisition / 
privatization: The potential grouping between 
two firms makes them unstable. This 
instability is most severe for State-Owned 
Firms planned for privatization under the 
Ordinance 01-04 of August 20, 2001 related to 
the organization, management and 
privatization of “Public Economic Enterprises” 
(Baaziz & Quoniam, 2013). A total of 417 
State-Owned Firms were privatized between 
2003 and 2007. (8)  
 
- Market trends: The pressure of new 
competitive environment brings much new 
information unexpected and incomprehensible. 
While a number of programs are in place to 
develop the non-petroleum economy, Algeria 
remains heavily dependent on oil and gas 
exports, which represent 97% of total exports 
and roughly 30% of GDP. This dependency 
remains a real barrier to build a sustainable 
development. According Oxford Business 
Group report about Algeria: In recent years, 
stagnating investor interest has raised concerns 
about Algeria’s ability to sustain current 
production levels, as a number of maturing 
fields will need to be replaced by new projects 
in the near term. Following a number of 
lackluster bidding rounds over the past four 
years, the government launched a review of 
Hydrocarbons Law with the view to make the 
sector more attractive to foreign investors. (9) 
- Laws & regulations’ changes: Unlike the 
national and foreign private firms that appeal 
to the international law firms, the Algerian 
State-Owned Firms overlook the contents of 
the Algerian legal arsenal in the continuing 
changes. (Baaziz & Quoniam, 2013). For 
                                                          
(8) Official wesite of Ministry of Industry, PME 
and Promotion of Investments. Available: 
http://www.mipmepi.gov.dz  
(9) Oxford Business Group, Algérie: Bilan de 
l’année 2012, January 16th, 2013, Available : 
http://www.oxfordbusinessgroup.com/economic_u
pdates/algérie-bilan-de-l’année-2012  
example, the hydrocarbon law was amended 
twice in less than ten years, the first occurred 
one year after the promulgation of the law. 
Each year, the promulgation of the Finance 
Act is systematically followed by a substantial 
and significant revision. Thus, the 
supplementary budget law "LFC 2009" was 
marked by the adoption of the letter of credit 
as the only mode of payment for foreign trade 
transactions, with an immediate effective date. 
This has caused serious disruptions in the 
supply chain and production of Algerian firms. 
(10)
 
 
- Criminalization of the wrong management act: 
Long as the subject was taboo. Decision 
leading to “bad business results” is not just a 
“wrong management act" but may be 
considered as an "economic crime" in light of 
the Algerian laws. Therefore, no range for 
error due to the undertaken risk is given to 
Managers who prefer the status quo to make a 
decision that dragged him to court or even jail. 
The Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika 
has instructed the government to prepare 
appropriate legislation to decriminalize the 
management act. (11) The decriminalization of 
the management act will end the confusion that 
makes victims among executive’s managers. 
Examples are numerous, we only mention: 
criminal trial of SIDER executive’s managers’ 
in 1997, CNAN case in 2006, SONATRACH 
case between 2010 to 2013, etc. For Master 
Zahouane (Lawyer and Human Rights 
Activist): “We should clear up the confusion 
between the management act which is the 
administrative responsibility and criminal act 
which is the penal responsibility (...) The 
penalty for the management  error must be 
disciplinal not penal (…) Releasing the 
management act without being assimilate that 
to impunity”. (12)  
 
- Legal context and partnership: The projects 
                                                          
(10) Le Quotidien d’Oran, newpaper of October 1st, 
2009, Pr. Mebtoul A. (Interview with.), Situation 
du secteur financier algérien et problème du crédit 
documentaire (credoc). Available: 
http://www.lequotidien-
oran.com/index.php?news=5127150 
(11) El-Moudjahid, newspaper of February 02nd, 
2011, Selon des avocats : La dépénalisation de 
l’acte de gestion mettra fin à la “confusion” et 
libérera l’acte d’entreprendre. Avalaible : 
http://www.elmoudjahid.com/fr/actualites/9007  
(12) El-Moudjahid, newspaper of February 02nd, 
2011, op-cited. 
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developed in partnership with several firms 
and the contracts concluded between them are 
liable to influence decisions or to hide 
information. The conflict between 
SONATRACH and its partners ANADARKO 
and MAERSK is an edifying example this 
situation. The difficulty of interpreting the 
regulation on Exceptional Profits Taxes (TPE 
regulation), forced SONATRACH to pay 
compensation up to $ 4.4 billion for 
ANADARKO and $ 920 million for 
MEARSK. (13) Nasreddine Lezzar (arbitration 
expert), says: “Sonatrach erred on two levels; 
the first being of retiring on the Aventine while 
the second evoked the choice to allocate the 
defense of the national company to an U.S. law 
cabinet (..) Sonatrach, the Algerian state 
company, was advised, in this case the volume 
of an affair of State, by an U.S. law cabinet, 
against an American company the size of a 
State. I would not presume to question the 
professionalism of the concerned cabinet, but 
at this level of interest, we must not allow the 
shadow of doubt”. (14)  
6.3 Information uncertainties 
Uncertainties linked to the Information are 
proprieties of this information in an environmental 
context where the decision is made (Zio & Pedroni, 
2012; AO2008, 2011; Zimmermann, 2000; 
Armacosta & Pet-Edwards, 1999 and Baumard, 
1997): 
 
- No information: lack of information. 
- Incompleteness: Partial information due to the 
incapability to obtain certain information or to 
a problem at the time of knowledge capitation 
or to the existence of general information 
usually true but subjected to exceptions that we 
                                                          
(13) El Watan, newpaper of March 12th, 2012, 
Roumadi M., Fin du différend avec Anadarko et 
Maersk L’Algérie paye cher la gestion opaque de 
Sonatrach, Available: 
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/l-algerie-paye-
cher-la-gestion-opaque-de-sonatrach-12-03-2012-
162499_109.php & 
http://lequotidienalgerie.org/2012/03/12/lalgerie-
paye-cher-la-gestion-opaque-de-sonatrach/  
(14) El Watan, newspaper of  June 29th, 2013, Elles 
cumulent les procès à l’international, nos 
entreprises sont mal gouvernées juridiquement, 
Available: http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/nos-
entreprises-sont-mal-gouvernees-juridiquement-29-
06-2013-219240_109.php & 
http://www.djazairess.com/fr/elwatan/419240  
cannot enumerate or predict (Bouchon-
Meunier, 1990). 
- Centralization: Excessive centralization of 
strategic information (Baumard, 1997). It is a 
common practice in Algerian State-Owned 
Firms where many documents have 
confidential status. The information is not 
simply an intellectual product but a political 
instrument for lobbies. The replay through the 
Information Systems affects the interests of 
particular influential groups. 
- Significance: The information is only a tiny 
part of the decision-making process in the firm 
(Keen, 1981). 
- Ambiguity: All languages have words that 
have different meanings depending on the 
context. This linguistic imprecision causes 
multiple conflicting interpretations, hence 
confusion and lack of understanding (Thiry, 
2002).  
- Subjectivity: This may be due to the subjective 
interpretation of little bits of available 
information. Depending on their skills and 
cultures, different analysts may provide 
different interpretations or even contradictory 
to the same information. This source of 
uncertainty can be reduced by soliciting 
multiple views of different experts.  
- Contradiction: Availability of abundant and 
conflicting information. 
- Multidisciplinary: Information that affects both 
several areas, causing understanding 
difficulties. 
- Volatility: The propensity to variability of 
value over time. 
- Measurement error or bad estimation: 
Measuring a quantity is always affected by the 
uncertainty due to the imprecision of the 
person taking the measurement or by the 
tolerance of the used instrument. 
6.4 Decision-maker uncertainties 
Decision-maker may be a person or a group. Each 
person reacts differently. The individual generators 
of uncertainty are not limited to his personality. 
Their experiences, knowledge and skills also play 
an important role (Baaziz, 2012). Individual 
generators are either psychological properties of the 
person, a lack of skills or low experience that 
creates uncertainty (AO2008, 2011): 
 
- Doubt: State of mind which wonders in a kind 
of questioning. 
- Hesitation: Lack of insurance and / or 
firmness. 
- Skepticism: State of mind of a person brings 
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disbelief or distrust to opinions and received 
values. 
- Irresolution: Personality trait of an incapable 
person to make decision whatever the context. 
- Indecision: Mental state of a person who has 
difficulty with self-determination. 
- Pessimism: State of mind of a person who 
persists to see only the bad side of things, to 
find everything is or will go wrong. 
- Risk aversion: Excessive afraid of risk whose 
result is an excessive distrust that paralyzes 
decision. Thus, risk-taking is seen as a threat. 
- Regretfully: Tendency to undermine the 
decision just taken by preferring an 
afterthought the not chosen option into the 
decision. 
- Lack of self-confidence: Lack of assurance that 
one can have in one’s own resources or 
destination. 
  
Other individual factors such as perception, 
reasoning mode, preferences, beliefs, convictions 
and emotions can amplify uncertainty. But we 
distinguish them of the cited generators because 
they play a dual role as they are both able to 
increase or decrease uncertainty. 
 
When the person is part of a group, it is in relation 
with the other members. Interactions and 
exchanges alter his behavior and give him/her more 
or less knowledge or doubt and impacting the 
position that results the uncertainty making 
(AO2008, 2011): 
 
- Contradictory debates: The confrontation 
between divergent views. 
- Influences of expertise: The influence of expert 
opinion. 
- Subordinate relationship between persons: 
Influence of a hierarchical superior on the 
views of its collaborators (Baumard, 1997). 
This is common in the very hierarchical firms 
such as State-Owned Firms. 
- Cultural differences: Existence of sub-groups 
with different visions of the firm’s strategy. 
- Group effects: Behavior pattern of a person 
related to the needs of the status and 
expectations of his group (Baumard, 1997). 
Often ideological or political affiliation is 
prioritized over the sense of belonging to the 
firm. 
 
7. Reduce the risk linked to the uncertainty of 
the competitive environment 
In fact, the environmental parameters generate 
signals that directly affect the firm and therefore 
the manager who picks up an environmental signal, 
reconstructs an image of this signal (with 
information’s distortion) according to his/her own 
understanding (experiences, skills) and brings its 
own interpretation (behavioral psychology) and 
reacts to its own interpretation of the signal. 
 
The explained uncertainties can guide the 
knowledge production process. Indeed, when they 
are explained, uncertainty is an impressive resource 
for decision-makers who are in a situation to reduce 
them without completely eliminate. There is 
probably a degree of uncertainty beyond which 
decision-makers becomes powerless and expose 
himself excessively to their management or their 
mandatory. 
 
The main actions allowing to manage uncertainty 
in order to reduce its risks (AO2008, 2011) are: 
 
- Correctly describe the unknown areas by 
establishing a new form of flexible 
organization, better prepared for unexpected 
events, enough resilient to adapt to uncertain 
environments. 
- Further investigate some of the unknown but 
plausible phenomena before making 
irreversible choices. It comes to organize 
trials upstream of decisive choices and avoid 
incurring their downstream effects. For this, 
there should be implemented a Strategic 
Intelligence Information System (SIIS) able 
to maintain a permanent state of the 
environment scanning and monitoring to 
identify signals announcing unexpected 
effects (Baaziz & Quoniam, 2013). 
- Find ways to make reversible choices that 
can interfere with the lesser known areas and 
provide the means to return to these choices, 
if there are unexpected effects. 
 
8. Of the Transformation to a new form of 
Organization to deal with uncertainty 
So dare to take the risk of transforming the 
organization towards models enabling enough pro-
activity, such as the “Extended Enterprise” model.  
 
The major risk would be an inertia which is a kind 
of resistance to fast and radical changes resulting 
from the transformation (Keen, 1981). We identify 
several sources of inertia (Besson & Rowe, 2011): 
 
- Psychological inertia related to the preference 
of the status quo; 
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- Cognitive inertia related to patterns of 
interpretation of the actors, resulting from their 
past experiences; 
- Socio- technical inertia related to the 
coherence and interdependence of technical 
systems between them of the one part, 
technical systems and skills to run them, on the 
other part; 
- Political inertia related to the sharing of 
authority, the governance form and the 
alliances; 
- Economic inertia related to the required 
investments and the existence of sunk costs. 
 
For the firm, the political, socio-technical and 
economic aspects are crucial to overcome inertia 
and begin the process of transformation (Besson & 
Rowe, 2011). Indeed, decision-makers must be 
willing to accept the declination and sharing power. 
This is a major policy decision sine qua non 
condition for initiating the process of 
transformation towards a new form of resilient 
organization. 
 
The transformation process must inevitably pass 
through four distinct, gradual and scalable phases 
(Besson & Rowe, 2011):  
 
1. Phase of uprooting that allows them out of the 
old organization; 
2. Phase exploration / construction of the new 
organization; 
3. Phase stabilization / institutionalization of the 
new organization; 
4. Phase optimization / routinization. 
 
A strategy for driving the transformation helps to 
reduce risks and uncertainties associated with the 
phases of the process (Besson & Rowe, 2011). 
9. Of the need to rebuild a Strategic 
Intelligence Information System to deal with 
uncertainty  
 
9.1 Strategic Intelligence Information System 
In such competitive environment, it is necessary to 
provide a tool for management of resilient owned-
state firms, allowing the conception and monitoring 
the Strategies with an improved visibility for 
piloting their activities according to their abilities 
"intramural" and "extramural" considering the 
influence of signals sensed in the environment 
where they operate. Hence the need to implement 
an information system strategic intelligence, able to 
(Baaziz & Quoniam, 2013): 
- Federate their knowledge and critical skills; 
- Ensure the rapprochement with firms that may 
have conjugated interests and complementary 
skills; 
- Organize and prepare internal and external 
information for improved visibility and 
decision-making; 
- Facilitate the exploitation of external 
knowledge bases such as patent databases in 
order to find practical alternatives of 
development coupled with a creative vision 
"out of the box" (Quoniam, 2013); 
- Scan external environment to detect the 
favorable signals for its positioning; 
- Facilitates decision making and reduce risks 
due to uncertainties inherent in its strategic 
choices. 
 
The Strategic Intelligence Information System 
cannot create a synergy for decision-makers, only if 
it is able to create this synergy between the own 
knowledge and critical skills of the firm 
(Knowledge Management), the ability to decrypt 
signals and changes in the environment where the 
Firm operates (through a competitive intelligence 
system) in order to claim to relevant decisions in a 
timely manner (by using the decision support tools 
known as Business Intelligence).  
 
Here, the concepts of Knowledge Management 
(KM), Competitive Intelligence (CI) and Business 
Intelligence (BI) operate at different levels of 
management: from strategic to operational (Baaziz, 
2012). 
9.2 The empirical model of "synergy of the 
triptych" 
The decision cannot be relevant only if it is taken in 
a context of intelligent learning organization where 
both internal KM and external CI information are 
available, up to date, analyzed and contextualized 
enabling the synergy of the triptych: KM, CI and 
BI. 
 
The decision support system (BI) can be based on 
the outcome of KM and CI in order to constitute 
hypotheses, analysis of alternatives for helping to 
lead the decision. The decision (outcome / output) 
becomes a component of organizational learning 
and enrich the knowledge base of the firm (based 
case study / input) (Baaziz, 2012). 
 
We propose an empirical model of decision 
making, as follows: 
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This process is apparently simple but in fact more 
complicated: 
 
1. First, relative to the prerequisites for this 
process, with the following assumptions: An 
environment conducive to a learning 
organization where the asset "knowledge" 
should be the focus of managerial concerns 
(Pesqueux, 2004), in order to get a return on 
investment visible operated on intangible 
assets. A firm knowledge should be managed 
as a single focal point, control of knowledge 
and skills. 
2. Then, there is the operation of other complex 
production processes of managerial 
knowledge: quest for information, 
interpretation and learning. We could say that 
with organizational knowledge, one is facing 
the production of organizational routines, 
hence the importance of the modification of 
routines to generate new knowledge. This 
transformation of knowledge obtained from 
external information that becomes an internal 
knowledge as a result of learning and 
ownership. (Pesqueux, 2005) 
3. The third hypothesis is the "non-linearity" of 
this process due to the uncertainty listed, 
mainly the "Decision-maker" which is an 
integral part of this process (Baaziz, 2012). 
Indeed, it is obvious that with the same 
environmental deals, the same informational 
database and the same decision-making tools, 
it is unlikely that two people with different 
experiences can produce convergent decisions. 
Each person reacts differently. Its culture, 
experiences, knowledge and skills also play an 
important role (Baaziz, 2012). The individual 
generators are either psychological properties 
of the person, or a lack of skills or experience 
that creates uncertainty (AO2008, 2011). So, it 
is important to involve the human dimension, 
see psychological aspect of the decision-maker  
 
 
who constitutes the catalyst of the desired 
synergy.  
4. The traceability of decisions’ actions is granted 
by the Strategic Intelligence Information 
System (SIIS). Hence the possibility of 
reviewing the success factors or failures by 
checking the knowledge base describing the 
cases: subject, context, environment 
description, profiles of the decision-makers, 
taken decisions and actions, etc. 
 
9.3 Towards the integration of triptych KM, CI & 
BI 
Customer satisfaction through Innovation, 
efficiency and performance of business processes 
requires upgrading the actors’ skills, hence the need 
to use a KM system for the knowledge 
capitalization of the firm. Indeed, knowledge is a 
combination of information (or observations) and 
their interpretations by persons who, based on their 
beliefs, thought patterns, theories and personal or 
collective experiences, make sense of this 
information (Prax, 2000). 
 
KM and CI are two activities that allow firms to be 
innovative, efficient and competitive by monitoring 
the one part, the external environment to decrypt 
weak signals, in order to go faster than its 
competitors and on the other, by following and 
monitoring internal changes they must operate in 
order to adapt, grow and innovate (Jakobiak, 2006; 
Goria, 2006). The goal of both is taking relevant 
decisions in a given context in order to grasp an 
opportunity or avoid a threat (Baaziz, 2012). 
 
In front of the environmental and organizational 
constraints of enterprises and the strong similarity 
of used tools of competitive intelligence and 
knowledge management, we cannot practically be 
in one of the domains without practicing the other. 
54 
O p i n i o n    S e c t i o n 
 
The strong similarities characterizing KM and CI 
tools lead us to combine efforts to set up for an 
improved synergy. We quote (Goria, 2006): 
 
- Building networks and communities of 
practice, 
- Guidance of the firm toward a learning 
organization, 
- A logic-oriented innovation by building a 
sustainable competitive advantage, 
- Strategic management of skills and human 
resources, 
- Management of intangible assets (including 
those of its partners) 
- Implication of the top management for the 
success of KM or CI project. 
- Common IT infrastructure (servers, databases, 
web 2.0, etc.) 
 
In point of view of Information Technology, this 
similarity is extensible to decision support systems 
(BI) which link the results of the KM and CI 
domains in order to constitute the assumptions, 
analysis of situations to lead to better decision-
making. 
 
This is true if we consider that the CI as the 
“external” KM (Pesqueux, 2004), because:  
 
- First, the tools, as well as terminology 
(web 2.0, mapping, search engine, 
information management tools , 
presentation, data warehousing, storage, 
statistics, correlation, data mining, big 
data, analytics, etc.) are reused in the 
context of KM, CI and BI; 
- A good command of the internal 
knowledge management depends on the 
external knowledge, especially for the 
KM-oriented business skills and 
marketing (Pesqueux, 2004); 
- The focus towards the client has greatly 
intensified in recent years. (Pesqueux, 
2004). 
 
This is a significant economic asset as investments 
in infrastructure; applications’ platforms and a part 
of the study are common. Then just develop for 
each domain, its specificities. 
 
The main contribution of this paper is the 
construction of the empirical model for the 
integration of the triptych KM, CI and BI to create 
synergies needed for suitable decision-making in an 
uncertain competitive environment and also enrich 
the strategic knowledge base for organizational 
learning. 
 
This model is applicable to the overall strategic 
analysis as follows: 
Fig.02. Enhanced LCAG model to Triptych Synergy model - describing the strategic review process 
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Algerian State-Owned Firm must 
undergo deep changes at the organizational level by 
adopting a new form of organization resilient like 
"extended enterprise" in order to combine skills and 
resources to ensure a competitive advantage to 
local and foreign private firms whose "culture of 
networking and collaboration" is well anchored. 
 
It must rebuild its information system accordingly, 
extended to its partners in order to exploit existing 
synergies "intramural" and "extramural". This gives 
the firm, the ability to innovate and reach the 
needed objectives of competitive advantage in an 
uncertain environment. 
 
By using benchmarking tools and best practices 
with private and international firms operating in 
Algeria (like CEVITAL, HENKEL, SANOFI-
AVENTIS, etc..), the leaders among Algerian 
State-Owned Firms such as SONATRACH, 
SONELGAZ and their respective subsidiaries, can 
demonstrate the efficiency of their process in 
continuous improvement following the 
transformation of the firm and the extension of 
their information systems by: 
 
- Better visibility of the political, economic, 
socio-cultural and technological environments 
in which they operate; 
- Mapping knowledge and skills of the firm but 
also those of their partners contributing to its 
extended value chain; 
- Mapping knowledge and skills of new key 
competitors in their main economic perimeter 
and / or geographical in order to achieve 
improved benchmarking; 
- The easy identification of sensitive information 
"weak signals" and key skills for innovation, 
performance and competitive advantage; 
- Creating favorable conditions for innovation 
by extending the partner network and building 
communities of practice; 
- Anticipating customer requirements and 
alternative solutions to potential competitors. 
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